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Constitutional Protection for Nonmedia
Defendants: Should There be a Distinction
Between You and Larry King?
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals ... The press in its historic connotation comprehends
every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information
and opinion.'
INTRODUCTION
On March 26, 2009, the notorious rocker and former lead singer of
the band "Hole," Courtney Love, was sued for libel by fashion designer
Dawn Simorangkir after Love made "vile and defamatory" statements
concerning Simorangkir on her Twitter account.2 While Love does not
fit within the typical definition of "media," these statements by Love
claiming that Simorangkir is a "thief," an "unfit parent, a racist and
homophobe," and a "danger to society" were circulated and read by
"potentially millions of people" who could simply follow Love's Twitter
feed.' Although this suit is still pending and it is unclear how the
Superior Court of California will decide, this action is indicative of what
the future may hold for internet users and the statements they make that
are disseminated through social networking websites such as Twitter,'
MySpace,5 and Facebook.6
1. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1938).
2. Manav Tanneeru, Can the Law Keep up with Technology?, CNN, Nov. 17, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009flECH/11/17Aaw.technology/index.html.
3. Shelia Marikar, Courtney Love's 'Malicious' Twitter Rants Revealed, Apr. 1, 2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/AheadoftheCurve/story?id=7219953; see also
Complaint at 1, Simorangkir v. Love, No. BG410593 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Mar. 26,
2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/Entertainment/courtney
love-lawsuit_090331.pdf (filing suit for libel, invasion of privacy, false light, intentional
interference with a prospective economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and breach of contract).
4. About Twitter, http://twitter.com/about#about (last visited Aug. 17, 2010)
(describing the system as a privately funded, real-time, short messaging service that
works over multiple networks and devices).
5. MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?
fuseaction=misc.terms (last visited Aug. 17, 2010) (explaining the operation of the
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Take, for example, Amanda Bonnen, a non-celebrity Twitter user
who did not have millions of followers - in fact, she only had twenty at
the time the "tweet" at issue was made.7 Bonnen was sued on July 20,
2009 in a defamation action by her former landlord, Horizon Group
Management LLC, after she "tweeted" about her moldy apartment."
Horizon claimed that this statement damaged its good name because the
web post was published "throughout the world" and sought $50,000 in
damages.9
Although Twitter is not the primary subject at issue, one has to
wonder: do these cases have merit? With the rapid growth of technology
and the popularization of internet blogs, the amount of information that
is uploaded by both the traditional media and nonmedia web users is
quickly increasing and with these posts, an ever-growing amount of
individuals are able to read what these people are saying. While the
Love case is still pending, 0 it is clear that at least some courts find
website to be a "social networking platform that allows members to create unique
personal profiles online").
6. Facebook "Friend" Profile, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf#/
facebook?v=info&ref=pf (last visited Aug. 17, 2010) (describing Facebook as a
networking site that gives people the power to share, keep up with friends, upload
photographs and learn more about people they meet).
7. The Internet Patrol, Property Management Company Sues Tenant Over Single
Tweet on Twitter, http://www.theinternetpatrol.com/property-management-company-
sues-tenant-over-single-tweet-on-twitter/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2010) (noting that
Bonnen has subsequently shut down her Twitter account).
8. See Christina M. Wright, Amanda Bonnen, Apartment Renter, Sued for 'Defamatory'
Twitter Post About Mold, THE HUFFINGTON PoST, July 28, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/27/amanda-bonnen-apartment-
r_n_245944.html.
9. Complaint at 1, 7, Horizon Group Mgmt., LLC v. Bonnen, No. 2009L008675 (Ill.
Ct. Cl. July 20, 2009), available at http://www.chicagonow.com/blogs/chicago-bar-
tender/Twitter%20lawsuit.pdf (filing suit for libel and attaching exhibit of Tweet no. 46).
10. The lawsuit against Amanda Bonnen was dismissed with prejudice on January
20, 2010 by Cook County Circuit Court Judge Diane Larsen based on a determination
that the tweet regarding Horizon Group Management, LLC, was "really too vague."
Bonnen's attorneys argued that the tweets posted were hyperbolic, were not statements
of fact, and were therefore "reasonably susceptible of innocent construction and
protected by the First Amendment." Horizon Group's attorneys again argued that
Bonnen's Twitter account was capable of being accessed around the world and that
"Bonnen shouldn't be shielded from responsibility because of how she views Twitter."
After considering both arguments, Judge Larsen, in dismissing the case, found that the
"tweet [was] non-actionable as a matter of law." See Jamie Loo, Judge: Tweet 'Lacks
Context' for Court Action, McCORMICK FREEDOM PROJECT, January 20, 2010,
http://www.freedomproject.us/post-exchange/Article-
Judge _dismisses twitterdefamation_1awsuit.aspx.
174 [Vol. 33:173
2
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss1/5
20101 CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR NONMEDIA DEFENDANTS 175
defamatory web posts to have some legal merit; however, it will likely
take years for the jurisprudence to catch up to technology and for courts
to sort through actions, such as these, to determine how the law
regarding the First Amendment should evolve to handle these situations.
If courts determine that Love's case is actionable and recovery
should be granted, the next question (and focus of this comment) is:
Does an individual like Love, who published information that was
disseminated to "potentially millions of people,"" deserve the same
constitutional protection that United States courts give to powerhouses
like Time Magazine or the Washington Post, which also publish
information that is distributed throughout the world?
To answer this question, it is necessary to understand the
background of defamation law and the role that media defendants have
played in the interpretation of the First Amendment. The distinction
between media and nonmedia defendants has served as a side-note to
many cases that have come close to or have actually reached the
Supreme Court of the United States, but that distinction has never been
addressed as a center-stage issue. However, in light of the growing uses
of technology that allow not only news outlets, but also average citizens,
to post their ideas, thoughts, and opinions online for the public to view,
it may be time for the courts to decide who deserves more protection:
USA Today, Courtney Love, or you.
Some state courts and federal district courts have specifically
recognized a distinction between media and nonmedia defendants in
defamation actions, one noted that "average-joe" nonmedia defendants
are given less constitutional protection than news-producing media,"
while another noted that although there is a distinction, plaintiffs suing
nonmedia defendants have the same First Amendment hurdles to
jump.'3 Other courts have determined that the First Amendment itself
11. Complaint at 14, Simorangkir v. Love, No. BG410593 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/Entertainment/
courtneyjlovelawsuit_090331 .pdf.
12. See Denny v. Mertz, 318 N.W.2d 141, 153 (Wis. 1981) ("While we recognize
that some courts in other jurisdictions have held that the Gertz protections apply to all
defamations, regardless of whether published through the media or by private persons,
we do not read Gertz as requiring that the protections provided therein apply to non-
media defendants, nor . .. do we consider it good public policy to so decide.").
13. See Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 778, 782-83 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) ("[All speakers, regardless of status as members of the organized press, are
entitled to . . . First Amendment protection. Although the Supreme Court has not yet
finally resolved the issue, the First Amendment itself would appear to admit of no
hierarchy of speakers, nor would its ends be served by judicially valuing speech by
criterion of source . . . . New York courts have accorded defamation protections to non-
3
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recognizes no distinction between media outlets and nonmedia reporters
who disseminate information to the public.'4
Perhaps the confusion amongst these lower courts has arisen
because the United States Supreme Court has consistently used the
words "media defendant" when discussing defamation actions.15
Alternatively, the confusion may be a result of the Supreme Court's
active avoidance of addressing the issue.'" Or, it could be that this
uncertainty has occurred on account of the high Court's decision in Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., in which the majority
affirmed a Vermont Supreme Court decision that recognized that First
Amendment protections apply only to media defendants (on different
grounds), while never specifically weighing in on the distinction made
by the Vermont state courts."
media defendants without elaborating whether the basis for doing so is found in the First
Amendment or in the state constitution.").
14. See Ayala v. Washington, 679 A.2d 1057, 1063 n.2 (D.C. 1996) ("The Supreme
Court has not ruled on . . . [the effect of] whether the defendant is properly
characterized as a member of the media . . . . This court has concluded, however, that the
First Amendment recognizes no such distinction."); see also In re IBP Confidential Bus.
Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 642 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The fact that cases such as New
York Times and Gertz involved media defendants, while arguably relevant in identifying
the particular first amendment freedom involved, is in our view irrelevant to the
question of what level of constitutional protection that right is to receive."); see also
Flamm v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A] distinction
drawn according to whether the defendant is a member of the media or not is
untenable."); Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219 n.13 (4th Cir. 2009) ("Neither the
Supreme Court nor this Court has specifically addressed the question of whether the
constitutional protections afforded to statements not provably false should apply with
equal force to both media and nonmedia defendants. . . . [W]e believe that the First
Amendment protects nonmedia speech on matters of public concern that does not
contain provably false factual assertions. Any effort to justify a media/nonmedia
distinction rests on unstable ground, given the difficulty of defining with precision who
belongs to the 'media.' . . . Thus, for our purposes, the status of the Defendants as media
or nonmedia is immaterial.").
15. See generally Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
16. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 n.6 (1990). ("In Hepps the
Court reserved judgment on cases involving nonmedia defendants . . . and accordingly
we do the same.").
17. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 753, 763
(1985) (affirming the Vermont Supreme Court's holding that "the media protections
outlined in Gertz are inapplicable to nonmedia defamation actions" but, "for reasons
different from those relied upon by the Vermont Supreme Court") (holding that
"[plermitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases absent a
showing of 'actual malice' does not violate the First Amendment when the defamatory
statements do not involve matters of public concern[,]" which affirmed the judgment of
the Vermont Supreme Court). But see id. at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that
176 [Vol. 33:173
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This Comment considers the current law, contemplates the rapid
growth of technology and proposes an answer to the following two
questions: Should there be a distinction between media and nonmedia
defendants? If so, who should be offered more protection: You or Larry
King? To answer these questions, Part I summarizes traditional and
current defamation law and the First Amendment protections that have
been meted out by the courts. Part II discusses the court decisions that
have noted whether a distinction between media and nonmedia
defendants is meritorious and critiques those conclusions in light of the
development of defamation law. Part III addresses the evolution of the
media by comparing early defamation actions with the current
circumstances facing American society, where newspapers are fading
away and the internet is on the rise. Additionally, this subsection
explains the necessity of defining the word "media," and theorizes how
the courts might do so in light of the rapid growth of technology.
Finally, Part IV contemplates whether there should be a distinction
between media and nonmedia defendants, explains the benefits and
downfalls of each approach, and predicts what may happen in the future
given that the ability to communicate defamatory statements now takes
mere seconds and has a potentially globalized effect.
I. DEFAMATION: WHO, WHAT AND How?
Defamation has been defined as communication that harms the
reputation of another so much that it lowers him in the eyes of his
community and potentially deters third parties from associating with
him.'" An individual may recover financially for defamation from the
person who has harmed his reputation or economic status by
establishing that: (1) a false and injurious statement was made against
him, (2) the statement was published, and (3) harm was caused by that
publication." Through the evolution of defamation cases, distinctions
have been made between plaintiffs that are public officials, public
figures, and private individuals.
"Isluch a distinction is irreconcilable with the fundamental First Amendment principle
that the inherent worth . .. of speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public
does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union,
or individual") (internal quotations omitted).
18. See Victoria Cioppettini, Comment, Modern Difficulties in Resolving Old Problems:
Does the Actual Malice Standard Apply to Celebrity Gossip Blogs?, 19 SETON HALLJ. SPORTS
& ENT. L. 221, 226 (2009) [hereinafter Cioppettinil.
19. Id. at 227.
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For a public official or public figure to recover for slander or libel,
he or she must show that the injurious statement made by the defendant
was made with "actual malice," which has been defined as making a
statement with "knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether [the statement] was false or not."20 A public official typically
denotes some form of government employee, whether the President, a
Congressman, or a city commissioner;" a public figure is one "whose
views and actions with respect to public issues and events are often of as
much concern to the citizen as the attitudes and behavior of 'public
officials' with respect to the same issues and events."n Because these two
types of plaintiffs have sought to become involved in the affairs of
society and should expect public comments relating to their fitness, they
must prove that the statement(s) they are challenging are false and have
caused harm to their reputation in order to surpass free speech
protections provided by the First Amendment.2 3 The courts have
reasoned that because public officials and public figures enjoy greater
access to channels of effective communication (i.e., they can make a
responsive statement of their own to the media and have it distributed
with ease) than private individuals, they must jump these additional
hurdles when filing suit against those that have critiqued their conduct,
capacity, or fitness to perform their official or public duties.24 Without
such protections, it is likely that public officials and public figures would
be less accountable and held to lesser standards than they should be
20. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-81 (1964) (defining actual
malice and stating that "[tihe constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice'); see also Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, J.,
concurring) ('[P]ublic figures' have as ready access as 'public officials' to mass media of
communication, both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and
activities . . . I therefore adhere to the New York Times standard in the case of 'public
figures' as well as 'public officials."').
21. See generally New York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Curtis Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. at 162 (1967) (Warren, J., concurring).
23. See In re IBP Confidential Bus. Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 643 (8th Cir.
1986). The Supreme Court has stated that a private individual who has not sought office
or influence and, as a result, has no prominent role in society is "more vulnerable to
injury" and is "more deserving of recovery." Id. at 643. Based on this, the Court has
provided that a private individual may establish liability and recover actual damages by
means of a simple showing of fault. However, actual malice must still be proven in order
for a private individual to recover presumed or punitive damages. Id. at 643-44.
24. See id. at 643. (acknowledging that "public officials and public figures are in a
better position than private individuals to attempt to rebut and reduce the harm of a
defamatory statement").
178 [Vol. 33:173
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because the public would fear legal liability when making valid
appraisals of the actions of those in positions of power.
As mentioned, the courts have determined that private individuals
need only provide a simple showing of fault to recover actual damages
for harm to their reputation.2 ' However, a distinction has been made
regarding recovery by a private individual depending on whether the
matter is of public or private concern.27 If a statement relates to a purely
private matter, the Constitution does not require any additional showing
of malice, meaning that a private figure harmed by a statement of private
concern can recover presumed and punitive damages without a showing
of actual malice.' On the other hand, if the statement made involves a
private individual and it relates to a matter of public concern, which is of
extreme importance to the First Amendment, the plaintiff must present
evidence of actual malice on the part of the defendant in order to recover
presumed or punitive damages.29 Whether a statement addresses a
matter of public concern can be determined by the "content, form and
context" of the publication and thus is a determination that courts must
make on a case-by-case basis.'
In addition to the distinctions made between plaintiffs, types of
damages that are recoverable, and whether the content of the statement
merits more constitutional protection, the courts have noted that the
First Amendment protects statements that cannot be reasonably
interpreted as stating "actual facts" about an individual." As a result of
this holding in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., two subcategories of
speech have been carved out as incapable of being interpreted as stating
"actual facts" about an individual and are thus constitutionally protected.
25. See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 282 (regarding the need for the public to be
able to comment on the activities of an official without fear of liability, the Court stated
that if First Amendment protections were not available to critical defendants, "the threat
of damage suits would otherwise 'inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective
administration of policies of government' and 'dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties"').
26. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (stating that
for recovery in the context of a private individual plaintiff "[i]t is necessary to restrict
defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth to compensation for actual injury").
27. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 774-75 (1986).
28. See id.
29. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-61
(1985).
30. Flamm v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2000).
31. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 220 (4th Cir. 2009) (discussing Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1990)).
7
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First, statements on matters of public concern that fail to contain a
"provably false factual connotation" are protected by the First
Amendment.32 Statements that reference issues of social or political
interest to a community are statements that involve matters of public
concern. 3 The community that is effected does not have to be large, nor
does the statement need be of "paramount importance or national scope"
for the defendant to be protected under the Constitution.
The second category of speech that is incapable of being interpreted
as stating "actual facts" about an individual is rhetorical statements that
use hyperbolic or figurative language." These types of statements are
protected to prevent a decrease in, or "chilling of," public debate and
discussion, a hallmark of our Constitution and nation; and, because
loose or figurative language is being utilized, the audience that receives
this information is likely to understand that the speaker is not asserting
actual facts.
With these various hurdles established, it is apparent that the First
Amendment has been interpreted as providing a great deal of protection
to individuals in our society who exercise their right of free speech.
However, it is clear that while defamation may be a difficult cause of
action to pursue, it is not impossible for a plaintiff to recover when his
reputation has been harmed - our judiciary promotes free speech at the
expense of some offended reputations, but once a defendant has crossed
the thresholds established, the court will step in and provide a remedy to
a harmed plaintiff.37 With this brief explanation of the law of defamation,
it is obvious that courts currently handling libel and slander suits must
navigate not only through decades of case law precedent, but also must
adjust to our ever changing society and the new ways that we
communicate information to interested parties.
II. MEDIA VS. NONMEDIA DEFENDANTS: WHAT THE COURTS HAVE SAID
The courts that have specifically addressed the distinction between
media and nonmedia defendants in defamation actions have reached
varying results. Some courts have noted that there is a distinction and
thus two divergent standards of protection. Others, although
32. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
33. Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 446 (4th Cir. 2004).
34. Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 132 (1st Cir. 1997).
35. See Snyder, 580 F.3d at 220.
36. Id.
37. See Cioppettini, supra note 18, at 231.
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recognizing a distinction between media and nonmedia defendants, have
determined that both potential defendants merit the same protection.
Still others have recognized that because the Constitution itself
recognizes no distinction, the courts should not either. In sum, the
lower courts, both state and federal, have made conflicting, inconsistent,
and confusing decisions. Moreover, the Supreme Court, although
presented with the opportunity to settle this controversy in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., avoided the issue of
distinguishing between media and nonmedia defendants, allowing the
ever-growing uncertainty to continue.
A. Two Types of Defendants: Two Standards of Protection
In Denny v. Mertz, a libel suit was brought by a stockholder against
his former employer and a publishing company who had broadcast a
false statement that the stockholder had been fired." In reaching its
decision, the court found that the constitutional protections provided for
media defendants when the defamatory statement involves a private
person, as explained in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., did not apply to
nonmedia defendants." Thus, as the dissent by Justice Abrahamson
notes, the majority in Denny v. Mertz effectively gave nonmedia
defendants less protection in exercising their constitutional right of free
speech than it gave the media.
In a case that arrived at the same conclusion, the Vermont Supreme
Court in Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. acknowledged
the fact that making a distinction between media and nonmedia
defendants was difficult to achieve, but noted that there is a clear
difference between a publication that disseminates "news" for public
consumption and one that provides specialized information to a select
audience." In justifying its holding that the media protections outlined
in Gertz are inapplicable to nonmedia defamation actions,4 the court
stated that in nonmedia defamation cases "[there is no threat to the free
and robust debate of public issues," there is no interference with the
"meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government," and there is
38. Denny v. Mertz, 318 N.W.2d 141, 141 (Wis. 1981).
39. Id. at 153.
40. Id. at 155 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
41. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 417-18 (Vt.
1983).
42. Id.
9
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no possibility of censoring the press.13 Therefore, because the traditional
constitutional values that the rules of defamation aim to protect are not
present, nonmedia defendants should not receive the same level of
constitutional protection."
B. Two Types of Defendants: One Standard of Protection
Despite the fact that some courts have given less protection to
nonmedia defendants, others have noted that there is a distinction
between the two parties, but nonmedia defendants still are entitled to
the same protection as members of the media. In Don King Productions,
Inc. v. Douglas, the court, in discussing what needed to be proven for the
defamation action to be successful, explicitly recognized that Don King
Productions was a nonmedia defendant, but stated that all speakers,
regardless of status as members of the organized press, are entitled to the
same amount of First Amendment protection." Recognizing that the
United States Supreme Court had not yet resolved the issue, the court
based its determination on the fact that the First Amendment does not,
on its face, appear to have a hierarchy of speakers and its ends would not
be served by valuing speech by its source."
C. One Type of Defendant: One Standard of Protection
Adding yet another layer of confusion to the media/nonmedia
dilemma, other courts have determined that the First Amendment itself
recognizes no distinction between media and nonmedia defendants. In a
defamation action by a pilot against his former lover, the court in Ayala
v. Washington provided a four factor approach to be utilized when
determining how a plaintiff may prevail and noted what protection, if
any, should be given to defendants." In a mere footnote, the court
briefly stated that a fifth factor, whether the defendant is properly
characterized as a member of the media, did not exist because the First
Amendment recognized no such distinction.
43. Id. at 418 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359,
1362-63 (Or. 1977)).
44. Id.
45. Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 778, 782-83 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
46. Id.
47. Ayala v. Washington, 679 A.2d 1057, 1062 (D.C. 1996) ("There are four factors
to be determined in the universe of First Amendment defamation law: the kind of
speech, the facts that must be proven, the certainty of proof required, and the type of
damages.").
48. Id. at 1063 n.2.
[Vol. 33:173182
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In addressing the fact that the Supreme Court, in defamation
actions, tends to speak in terms of "press and broadcast media" when
discussing defendants, the court in Bainhauer v. Manoukian determined
that although the Court uses this language, it still reaches its decisions
based on the nature of the defamatory statement and the person defamed
rather than the person who made the statement. 9 Agreeing with the
Restatement of Torts (Second), the court held that there was no reason
to distinguish between media and nonmedia defendants." Those courts
that have specifically cited the Supreme Court as a basis for their
decisions have recognized that although the Court, as stated above,
consistently uses the words "media defendant" in discussing those
individuals that are being sued, it has chosen to not specifically rule on
the issue. Subsequent Supreme Court and lower court decisions have
relied on that fact as a reason to do the same."
D. Dun & Bradstreet: Vermont Supreme Court v. the Supreme Court of the
United States
As to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., as previously discussed supra, the Vermont Supreme
Court held that nonmedia defendants do not merit the same
constitutional protection as defendants who disseminate "newsworthy"
information because the First Amendment values that the laws of
defamation aim to protect (i.e., free debate and press censorship) are not
implicated.5 2 However, the Supreme Court, although affirming the
decision in favor of the plaintiff, opted to rest its decision on the fact that
the statement involved no matters of public concern and therefore the
plaintiff need not show actual malice in order to recover presumed and
punitive damages.5 ' This holding created yet another layer of confusion
for lower courts to wade through when determining whether to provide
different levels of protection to media or nonmedia defendants because
rather than speaking specifically to the methodology utilized by the state
court, the Supreme Court simply stated, "We now affirm, although for
49. Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 520 A.2d 1154, 1167 n.7 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1987).
50. Id.
51. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219 n.13 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 n.6 (1990).
52. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 417 (Vt.
1983).
53. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760-61
(1985).
11
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reasons different from those relied upon by the Vermont Supreme
Court."" Despite the elusiveness of the majority, Justice Brennan made
clear in his dissent that a distinction should not be drawn, stating that
such a distinction between media and nonmedia defendants is
"irreconcilable with the fundamental First Amendment principle that
'[t]he inherent worth of . . . speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union, or individual."'"
With a brief overview of only a minute portion of the cases that
have touched on the media/nonmedia distinction, it is clear that there is
no consistency within our judicial system as to whether nationwide news
outlets merit more or less protection than an individual who creates a
newsletter and posts it on a community board. Having already set forth
a multitude of factors concerning whether an action has merit (i.e., type
of plaintiff, public or private concern, level of fault, type of damages), a
simple statement by the high Court would resolve this vast uncertainty
and establish whether the lower courts need to add one more factor
(media/nonmedia defendant) to their methodology. In light of the fact
that the line between members of the media and nonmedia citizens has
blurred due to the expansion and globalization of the internet, it may be
necessary for the Court to determine whether there should be a
distinction once and for all. Knowledge of this decision would not only
provide potential plaintiffs with the ability to determine if their
complaint will be successful, but would also put web users on notice of
whether they will be afforded the same constitutional protection as a
reporter for USA Today when they comment online or blog about their
opinions on the same matter.
III. THE GREAT DEBATE: WHO IS THE "MEDIA"?
Prior to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
consistently viewed defamatory statements as being "wholly unprotected
by the First Amendment."6 However, in New York Times, Co., the Court
began to acknowledge the importance of protecting this form of free
speech and started the journey toward defending defamatory
54. Id. at 753.
55. Id. at. 782 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that it would be difficult to define the
media and "the distinction would likely be born an anachronism").
56. Ruth Walden & Derigan Silver, Deciphering Dun & Bradstreet: Does the First
Amendment Matter in Private Figure-Private Concern Defamation Cases?, 14 COMM. L. &
POL'Y 1, 4 (2009) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White,
J., dissenting)).
184 [Vol. 33:173
12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss1/5
20101 CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR NONMEDIA DEFENDANTS 185
communications, placing high burdens of proof on plaintiffs." As the
law of defamation has evolved, the courts have meted out different
standards for different plaintiffs, noted the different types of damages
that may be awarded dependent upon a showing of negligence or malice,
and created precedent for cases involving public and private concern.
During this progression, the cases that courts have heard when creating
our current law have traditionally involved news-media defendants who
have disseminated information to a "community," whether it be large or
small, which has resulted in harm to the plaintiffs reputation.
With the creation of more print newspapers, more defamation
actions ultimately have resulted, but the standards, as applied to news-
media, have remained consistent with the methodology prescribed by
the courts. However, as technology evolves and non-news-media
individuals become more capable of distributing information to a
community relevant to a plaintiff, the law of defamation may need to
evolve as well to account for the fact that these individuals, while stating
matters that are significant to them, may harm the reputation of another
intentionally or unintentionally by disseminating information that can
be read online by people around the world.
The necessity of having a media/nonmedia distinction is uncertain;
however, what is clear is that the courts need to make a consistent
decision about whether there is a different standard for the two. With
the state and federal court systems arriving at different conclusions
about the requirements of the First Amendment, in light of the rise of
the citizen journalist, the celebrity journalist, and the pseudo-journalist,
decisions must be made regarding: (1) whether there is a distinction
between media and nonmedia defendants, and (2) if there is a hierarchy
of defendants, as proscribed by the Constitution, what constitutes "the
media." These decisions must be made so that it is clear who is protected
when case law precedents are made.
A. Traditional Media Defined
The traditional definition of media is "the means of communication,
[such] as radio and television, newspapers, and magazines, that reach or
influence people widely."" While the Supreme Court has never
specifically defined media in its own terms, it has referred to
"publishers," "broadcasters," and "the press," all of whom distribute the
57. Id. at 4-5.
58. Define Media at Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/media
(last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
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above listed forms of communication, in its libel decisions, thus
comporting with the dictionary and common sense definitions of what
the average person would conclude that "media" encompasses." It has
been noted that defining "media" is a difficult, if not impossible task,60
but the above two explanations offer a simple, yet compelling, starting
place.
To take the definition a step further, and to combat those who have
expressed doubt by stating that defining the term media is an impossible
task, one can look to state "shield laws," which provide protection for
media sources in governmental proceedings.6 ' Because legislatures have
already narrowed down which media outlets merit the discretion to and
privilege of protecting their sources, it is possible that the judiciary
could adopt the groups (i.e., newspapers of general circulation, radio,
television stations, and magazines of general circulation) protected by
these laws and simply utilize that definition in their analysis and
decisions. However, with seventeen states having no media protection
law,62 four providing minimal protection to publishers,63 and the
remaining twenty-nine states setting forth differing standards of
64protection, consistency will be hard to establish and the courts may be
59. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974) ("We hold that, so
long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves
the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory
falsehood injurious to a private individual ... [This approach] recognizes the strength of
the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to
reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for
defamation.").
60. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 781-83
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Log Creek, LLC v. Kessler, No. 4:09cv401-
RH/WCS, 2010 WL 2426612, at *10 (N.D. Fla. June 3, 2010) ("[Giving controlling
effect to a defendant's media or nonmedia status would require difficult or impossible
line-drawing.").
61. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1986) (referencing
the Pennsylvania shield law that states "[nlo person employed by any newspaper of
general circulation or any radio or television station, or any magazine of general
circulation, shall be required to disclose the source of any information procured or
obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any
government unit") (internal quotations omitted).
62. Meghan Martin & Larry Larsen, A Guide to Journalist Shield Laws,
http://www.poynterextra.org/shieldlaw/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
63. Id.
64. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2009):
(a) Definitions. -- The following definitions apply in this section:
(1) Journalist. -- Any person, company, or entity, or the employees,
independent contractors, or agents of that person, company, or entity,
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forced to draw a line where they are uncomfortable doing so because of
the lasting effects such a definition may have.
engaged in the business of gathering, compiling, writing, editing,
photographing, recording, or processing information for dissemination via
any news medium.
(2) Legal proceeding. -- Any grand jury proceeding or grand jury
investigation; any criminal prosecution, civil suit, or related proceeding in
any court; and any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding before any
administrative, legislative, or regulatory board, agency, or tribunal.
(3) News medium. -- Any entity regularly engaged in the business of
publication or distribution of news via print, broadcast, or other electronic
means accessible to the general public.
(b) A journalist has a qualified privilege against disclosure in any legal
proceeding of any confidential or nonconfidential information, document, or
item obtained or prepared while acting as a journalist.
(c) In order to overcome the qualified privilege provided by subsection (b) of
this section, any person seeking to compel a journalist to testify or produce
information must establish by the greater weight of the evidence that the
testimony or production sought:
(1) Is relevant and material to the proper administration of the legal
proceeding for which the testimony or production is sought;
(2) Cannot be obtained from alternate sources; and
(3) Is essential to the maintenance of a claim or defense of the person on
whose behalf the testimony or production is sought.Any order to compel
any testimony or production as to which the qualified privilege has been
asserted shall be issued only after notice to the journalist and a hearing
and shall include clear and specific findings as to the showing made by the
person seeking the testimony or production.
(d) Notwithstanding subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a journalist has no
privilege against disclosure of any information, document, or item obtained as
the result of the journalist's eyewitness observations of criminal or tortious
conduct, including any physical evidence or visual or audio recording of the
observed conduct.
with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West 2001):
No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial before
any court, or before any grand or petit jury, or before the presiding officer of
any tribunal, or his agent or agents, or before the General Assembly, or any
committee thereof, or before any city or county legislative body, or any
committee thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any information procured or
obtained by him, and published in a newspaper or by a radio or television
broadcasting station by which he is engaged or employed, or with which he is
connected.
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B. Defining the Media of the Future
In addition to the problems that the courts may have in defining
"traditional" media, because we are now in limbo between the past and
future where newspapers and magazines are fading out and the most
prominent news source is now the internet, this evolution must be taken
into account. Due to the ease by which individuals can publish their
thoughts and opinions via blogs, social networking websites, and
podcasts, the courts, if they choose to create a media/nonmedia
distinction, must determine how they will treat web-users that utilize
these internet options in light of the First Amendment. To do so, the
court most likely will not only consider who the publisher is, but also
the conduit of the publication, the community that is viewing the
information, and the method of posting the statement at issue.
Adding to these initial barriers, which are substantial, the courts
will also be faced with the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"),"
which was enacted by Congress in order to provide additional
protections for speech on the internet.66 In ratifying the CDA, Congress
attempted to prevent defamation lawsuits from "stifling the technology
before it could get off the ground."67 This Act presents probably the most
difficult task the courts will face if these standards are established
because it creates an additional obstacle for an individual attempting to
recover for defamation: pinpointing who in fact made the defamatory
statement.6 8 While it is fairly simple to point to the author of an article
in the New York Times, the CDA provides civil immunity to Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs") for information that is posted on the internet
as a result of their services." Not only is the "host website" free from
liability, but it also may be difficult to determine who the defamatory
poster is because of the anonymity provided by many ISPs. Based on
these factors, it is clear that making a distinction between media and
nonmedia defendants would have been a fairly simple task two decades
ago, but in light of growth of the internet and the ease of access to the
world wide web, courts face a massive hurdle if they choose to finally
make a definitive decision on whether there is a distinction between
these two entities.
65. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2010).
66. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(3); see also Cioppettini, supra note 18, at 231-32.
67. Cioppettini, supra note 18, at 231.
68. Id. at 241-42.
69. Id. at 242 (noting that the CDA defines an ISP as "any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the internet or any other interactive computer service").
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C. Why a Defining Decision is a Necessity
The importance of making a media/nonmedia distinction (and thus
defining the term media) lies in the fact that, as the judiciary hears and
decides more and more defamation cases, it continues to increase (or
decrease) the level of protection provided to entities that may be
considered newly legitimate news sources. With the rapid growth of
technology, it is difficult to determine who the term "media"
encompasses and who is actually responsible for the defamatory
statement published on the internet.
The rise of both the citizen and celebrity journalist, such as Amanda
Bonnen and Courtney Love, both of whom disseminate information
quickly via blogs and social networking websites, present difficult
problems in light of the fact that most of these web users have a
substantial number of "followers" who read and potentially pass on the
statements that they have seen. Not only do they have the potential to
report legitimate "news," but they also have the opportunity to quickly
post statements that are vicious, harmful, and false. If the courts choose
to define these persons as members of the "media" or choose not to make
a distinction at all, thus placing them on equal footing with the
publishers of the Washington Post, they can quickly wrap themselves in
the First Amendment and force a plaintiff to jump high hurdles in order
to be vindicated. Although defamation by private parties has always
been a problem, the ease of access to the internet has made it a more
prevalent problem for plaintiffs who seek to recover for the harm done
to their reputation by a defamatory statement.
IV. SHOULD THERE BE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN MEDIA AND NONMEDIA
DEFENDANTS?
Based on the brief overview of the law that has been presented in
this Comment, it is clear that defendants in defamation actions are
wrapped tightly in the Constitution - so much so that it is hard for a
plaintiff to be successful when he must navigate through the multitude
of obstacles that are characteristic of our nation's law on defamation.
With this in mind, it is important to question whether a web-blog user,
on Facebook, for example, who discusses her job, relationships, or take
on current events should be given the same protections as a typical
media defendant (i.e., a newspaper with nationwide circulation) that
generates a publication that not only discusses relevant affairs affecting
our country, but also includes editorial pieces critiquing our society.
This Comment would suggest that the argument could go either way.
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On one hand, if this Facebook user decides to make a libelous post
about her employer, for the sake of consistency, she should be given the
Constitutional protection that is mandated by the First Amendment and
enjoyed by the traditional media. On the other hand, her post is
arguably not newsworthy and probably not of public concern like a
piece in the Washington Post, but still, depending on various factors
such as the size of the community reading the post and the nature of the
statement, the post has most likely caused reputational harm to her
employer. This conundrum is why it is important for the courts to
address the media/nonmedia distinction; because both arguments have
merit, lower courts that are making these decisions are not right or
wrong, but without a clear-cut standard, remain inconsistent.
If it is decided that media can be defined and there should be a
different standard for nonmedia defendants, the next question that we
are faced with is: Who deserves more protection? If the standard for
filing suit against a nonmedia defendant is lower (i.e., it is not as hard to
sue a nonmedia defendant and return with favorable verdict), then these
web-users (who are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as
the editors of the New York Post) would become very hesitant to express
their right to free speech. This "chilling" effect would disserve one of the
notions that defamation laws were established on: free debate. And
without a greater justification than the fact that this Facebook user is not
providing news on a nationwide level, one has to wonder: "Why should a
non-media defendant who defames a person have any less constitutional
protection than a media defendant who defames the same person?"" In
addition to the chilling of free speech that would result from not
providing the same constitutional protection for individuals that are not
members of the news media, it is possible that individuals would attempt
to disseminate their defamatory statements to a larger audience in hopes
that their efforts would qualify them as "media," thus receiving greater
protection, but also causing greater harm to a plaintiff. It seems
counterintuitive that an individual would attempt to make her statement
more widespread when facing potential civil liability, but it is a distinct
possibility that this could be done in an effort to receive the
constitutional protection afforded to the "media" if the courts recognize
such a distinction and a lower burden of proof.
Alternatively, if it is decided that there should be no distinction
between media and nonmedia defendants, either because the definition
of media is impossible to ascertain or because the First Amendment does
not recognize a hierarchy of defendants in providing Constitutional
70. Denny v. Mertz, 318 N.W.2d 141, 158 (Wis. 1981) (emphasis added).
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protection, it must be understood that we may be giving "average-joe"
internet users a free range opportunity to be malicious in their web-
postings by granting them the protection that is offered to traditional
media defendants. Knowledge that their statements will be fiercely
protected on the grounds of freedom of speech, freedom of debate, and
prevention of censorship, nonmedia defendants may use these
Constitutional protections in an inappropriate manner. With a lesser
likelihood of liability, bloggers and social network users may make
vicious statements about third parties online and escape scot-free from
adequate punishment. With the general law currently not making a
distinction between media and nonmedia defendants in defamation
actions, the Courtney Love type cases are the guinea pigs that we must
watch to see how this lack of differentiation will play out.
V. CONCLUSION
In December 2009, actor Rob Livingston of "Office Space" fame filed
a lawsuit against an anonymous Wikipedia writer for posting on
Livingston's entry that he is homosexual and in a relationship with
another man.n In his suit for libel, Livingston also notes that an
anonymous Facebook user has created a faux profile stating that he is in
a relationship with "Lee Dennison," when in fact he married a woman
named Rosemarie DeWitt in 2009.72 Wikipedia is a "web-based, free-
content encyclopedia" that can be edited and/or changed by "[a]ny one
with internet access" and because the website's policy is to not require
posters to provide their real name, Wikipedia provides protection to a
writer's privacy unless he or she chooses to identify himself or herself.73
Because of these protections provided by Wikipedia, it is probable that
Livingston's suit is merely a shot-in-the-dark attempt to vindicate his
71reputation."
71. See Bridget W., Office Space Star Sues Wikipedia ... Sort Of, WEBSTER UNIVERSITY
MEDIA LAW CLASS BLOG, Dec. 9, 2009, http://webstermedialaw.blogspot.com/
2009/12/office-space-star-sues-wikipediasort-of.html; see also Jonathan Bailey, 5 Legal
Issues to Watch in 2010, THE BLOG HERALD, Dec. 14, 2009,
http://www.blogherald.com/2009/12/14/5-legal-issues-to-watch-in-2010/.
72. See Omar Ha-Redeye, Ron Livingston Sues Wikipedia Over Orientation, LAw is
CooL, Dec. 6, 2009, http://lawiscool.com/2009/12/06/ron-livingston-sues-wikipedia-
over-orientation/.
73. Wikipedia: About, http://en.wikipedia.orgfwiki/Wikipedia:About (last visited
Aug. 17, 2010).
74. Bridget W., Office Space Star Sues Wikipedia . .. Sort Of, WEBSTER UNIVERSITY
MEDIA LAW CLASS BLOG, Dec. 9, 2009, httpJ//webstermedialaw.blogspot.com/2009/12/
office-space-star-sues-wikipediasort-of.html.
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In situations such as the one faced by Livingston, not only has the
First Amendment impeded his attempt to get justice, but it also places a
high set of burdens on other plaintiffs like him, who are attempting to
recover for reputational damage caused by a vicious defendant. As is
seen in this case, as well as the cases of Courtney Love and Amanda
Bonnen, the internet has provided another method of defaming a person
or entity because it permits illegitimate "news" sources to post
information on the World Wide Web with ease and a globalized effect.
Despite the fact that it may sometimes be hard to point to who exactly
the defendant is, it is apparent in situations such as these that the web-
users making these harmful statements tend to rashly make posts that
have injurious effects without acknowledging the consequences of their
actions. Perhaps determining how these defendants will be treated in a
lawsuit when and if these issues are presented to the judiciary will alter
the way in which we all use the internet; or perhaps it will have no effect
at all.
The bottom line is that individuals using Wikipedia, Facebook,
Twitter, MySpace and blogs often do not think about the repercussions
of the posts they make online. If their statements are deemed to be
offensive and harmful to the reputation of another, a cause of action for
defamation may ensue. This is where the courts need to make a
decision: Do these average citizen web-users, who are making statements
to the entire world, merit the same protection granted by the First
Amendment that legitimate media defendants receive? Although the
courts have been able to skirt around the issue for decades, in light of
the rise of citizen journalists, the time has come for a decision to be
made: Is there a distinction between media and nonmedia defendants?
Rebecca Phillips
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